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IS FANTASY BASEBALL FREE SPEECH?
REFINING THE BALANCE BETWEEN THE RIGHT OF
PUBLICITY AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
"MLB Would Like You to Stop Enjoying [Its] Product So Much."
I. INTRODUCTION
Never one to shy away from a public relations "challenge," Major
League Baseball (MLB) has been hyper-aggressive in seeking royal-
ties from other businesses that use anything MLB-related. 2 Fantasy
baseball, a game based on the day-to-day statistics of professional
ballplayers, has been no exception.3 When the internet enabled fan-
tasy leagues to become commercially viable in the mid-90s, 4 MLB be-
gan to seek and obtain licensing agreements from fantasy baseball
providers.5 The providers paid MLB a share of their profits in ex-
change for permission to use players' names and daily statistics.6
But there is an interesting legal issue lurking here: Does the law
require a fantasy provider to purchase a license from MLB? Fantasy
baseball is yet another example of new technologies stretching old
laws. On the one hand, fantasy sports are a lot like newspaper sports
statistics sections, which can be printed royalty-free because they en-
1. Will Leitch, MLB Would Like You to Stop Enjoying Their Product So Much, DEADSPIN,
Aug. 10, 2006, http://deadspin.com/sports/baseball/mlb-would-like-you-to-stop-enjoying-their-
product-so-much-193396.php.
2. See Ebenezer Samuel & Ian Begley, The Score Hears... Wright Has Eyes for Johan, N.Y.
DAILY NEWS, Jan. 13, 2008, at 81.
3. Although most readers will already be sufficiently familiar with fantasy baseball, a brief
explanation is offered here. Individuals join a league, usually on the internet, where they com-
pete against one another via imaginary piecemeal teams that are created from real Major
League Baseball players. Prior to the beginning of the season, a draft is held where each partici-
pant takes turns selecting an assortment of players for his own team. As the season then unfolds,
the accomplishments of each baseball player generate points for the fantasy participant who has
that player on his team. Points are calculated based on the player's game statistics. All players
may be traded or cut, so that an individual selects and changes his team based on who he be-
lieves will perform the best. At the end of the season, the points are tallied, and a winner
emerges.
4. The game's popularity has since exploded. Today, there are over 15 million people spend-
ing about $1.5 billion every year in fantasy sports. Alan Schwarz, Baseball Is a Game of Num-
bers , But Whose Numbers Are They?, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 2006, at Al.
5. See, e.g., C.B.C. Distrib. and Mktg., Inc., v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P.,
505 F.3d 818 (8th Cir. 2007). The fantasy provider in this case first obtained a license in 1995.
6. See id.
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joy full First Amendment protection.7  On the other hand, fantasy
sports are also a lot like MLB-based electronic video games, which
can be sold only if the video game makers purchase licenses for the
players' collective "right of publicity."8
A right of publicity is defined as the inherent right of every person
to control the commercial use of his identity. 9 It is a state-created law
in the nature of an intellectual property right.10 The classic violation
is the case of a business unfairly using a celebrity's name or image to
enhance a product's marketability." For example, Gatorade bottles
would not be able to lawfully display a picture of LeBron James with-
out his permission. Similarly, a business selling a cruise marketed
under the name "Tom's Cruise" would be liable to the actor.12
These examples illustrate only the most common violations-mis-
leading advertisements or false endorsements. But the scope is not
necessarily so limited. The wording of most states' right of publicity
laws is considerably broader, seemingly prohibiting any use of another
person's identity for one's own commercial gain.13 The Restatement
of Unfair Competition chose this language: "One who appropriates
the commercial value of a person's identity by using without consent
the person's name, likeness, or other indicia of identity for purposes of
trade is subject to liability. . . ."14 A creative lawyer could suit a vari-
ety of factual circumstances to this law.
Fantasy baseball, for example, seems to fit the literal mold, albeit
perhaps not quite as neatly as a false endorsement. Still, fantasy base-
ball "appropriates" the "commercial value" of a "person's identity,"
and it is done "without consent." All of the elements are present,
constituting a prime facie showing.15 Nonetheless, the saving grace of
the fantasy baseball industry lies in its continual dissemination of sta-
7. Gionfriddo v. Major League Baseball, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 307, 314 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) ("It is
manifest that as news occurs, or as a baseball season unfolds, the First Amendment will protect
mere recitations of the players' accomplishments.").
8. Richard T. Karcher, The Use of Players Identities in Fantasy Sports Leagues: Developing
Workable Standards for Right of Publicity Claims, 111 PENN ST. L. REV. 557, 570 (2007).
9. J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHIS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 1:3 (2d ed. 2007).
10. Id.
11. See id. § 7:7.
12. A similar situation arose in Henley v. Dillard Dep't Stores, 46 F. Supp. 2d 587 (N.D. Tex.
1999) (holding a department store liable for advertising a shirt displaying the phrase, "This is
Don's henley").
13. Currently, the right of publicity is recognized as the law, either by statute or by common
law, in twenty-eight states. MCCARTHY, supra note 9, § 6:3.
14. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 (1995) [hereinafter
RESTATEMENT ].
15. Admittedly, not everyone would agree that all elements of the claim are so easily met. See
infra notes 134-35 and accompanying text.
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tistics, which arguably offers the same free speech protection given to
traditional media. After all, the First Amendment is critical in limit-
ing the broad language of right of publicity laws. Without it, there
could be liability even for legitimate parodies and social commenta-
ries, news reporting and entertainment, and works of fiction and non-
fiction.16 Free speech principles keep right of publicity laws
appropriately confined. Exactly where the balance should be struck,
which is a common point of disagreement,' 7 is the heart of this
dispute.
With the recent popularity boom of fantasy sports, this issue be-
came economically significant. And economic significance tends to
breed litigation. In 2005, a fantasy baseball provider initiated a fed-
eral declaratory judgment action in the Eastern District of Missouri,
seeking a ruling that it was under no obligation to obtain permission
from MLB's for usage of the players' names and statistics.' 9 In C.B.C.
Distribution and Marketing, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced
Media, L.P.,2 0 the district court ruled in favor of the fantasy pro-
vider.21 On appeal, the Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that the First
Amendment shields fantasy baseball providers from any right of pub-
licity claims.22
Although the various state right of publicity laws comprise what
Professor McCarthy has called a "crazy quilt of different responses at
different times to different demands on the legislatures," 23 their dis-
16. This list is loosely borrowed from RESTATEMENT, supra note 14, § 47 cmt. c. The Restate-
ment mentions three areas in particular that should receive First Amendment protection: news,
entertainment, and creative works. Id. Also, "the use of a person's name or likeness in news
reporting, whether in newspapers, magazines, or broadcast news, does not infringe the right of
publicity." Id.
17. See, e.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977); ETW Corp. v. Jireh
Publ'g, Inc. 332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003): Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players
Ass'n, 95 F.3d 959 (10th Cir. 1996); Comedy III Prod., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 25 Cal. 4th 387
(2001); Gionfriddo v. Major League Baseball, 94 Cal. App. 4th 400 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001).
18. Although it is an oversimplification, this paper will often refer to MLB, MLB Advanced
Media, and the players collectively as "MLB." However, the particular relation among them is
as follows: The players assigned their rights of publicity in interactive media (which includes
fantasy baseball) to the MLB Players' Association. The Players' Association then licensed those
rights to MLB Advanced Media, which is a corporate sub-arm of MLB that handles interactive
media and internet operations. Thus, MLB Advanced Media held the rights at the time, and was
the defendant in the suit. See C.B.C. Distrib. and Mktg., Inc., v. Major League Baseball Ad-
vanced Media, L.P., 505 F.3d 818 (8th Cir. 2007).
19. Id. at 821.
20. C.B.C. Distrib. and Mktg., Inc., v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P., 443 F.
Supp. 2d 1077 (E.D. Mo. 2006), affd, 505 F.3d 818 (8th Cir. 2007).
21. C.B.C., 443 F. Supp. 2d at 1107.
22. C.B.C., 505 F.3d at 820.
23. MCCARTHY, supra note 9, § 6:6.
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tinctions are relatively minor, and their commonalities are sufficient
to allow for a singular study of how fantasy sports should be treated in
the majority of states. 24 Moreover, the Missouri common law right of
publicity claim used in the CBC suit, which looks to the Restatement
of Unfair Competition as legal authority,25 is adequately representa-
tive of most states. Thus, the discussion that follows is intended to be
universally applicable. In this paper, I will first argue that providers of
fantasy sports should not be permitted to operate with immunity
under the First Amendment. 26 I will then take a specific and critical
look at the recent CBC decision,27 which will be used primarily as a
vehicle to address some of the more common arguments offered by
those siding with the fantasy providers.
II. RIGHT OF PUBLICITY VERSUS RIGHT TO FREE SPEECH
The right of publicity and the First Amendment frequently en-
croach on one another, and it is not immediately clear how the tension
should be resolved. 28 This is not a new problem; however, and courts
in the past have developed a variety of frameworks to harmonize the
competing rights. 2 9 In order to properly frame the issue, it is impor-
tant initially to carefully define the legal test that should be used.
A. The United States Supreme Court Speaks
While the U.S. Supreme Court's First Amendment jurisprudence is
vast, there has only been one decision addressing free speech's inter-
play with publicity rights: Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting
Co. 3 0 While the facts of that case are readily distinguishable from fan-
tasy sports, some general principles set out by the Court are helpful.
In Zacchini, the Court held that when a television news program
broadcast the entire fifteen second act of a performer's "human can-
24. The differences among the laws are chiefly centered on whether "photograph" and
"voice" are explicitly mentioned along with "name" and "likeness," whether the rights are de-
scendible, how long they should last after death, the nature of remedies, and whether there are
specific built-in free speech protections. A chart outlining these differences can be found at
MCCARTHY, supra note 9, § 6:8. None of these differences would have a significant impact on
the CBC case.
25. C.B.C., 505 F.3d at 822.
26. See infra Part II.
27. See infra Part 111.
28. See M CARTHY, supra note 9, § 8:23 ("It is important to remember that even if the ac-
cused communication is classified, not as 'commercial speech,' but as full-fledged communicative
speech, the First Amendment does not automatically and of its own weight crush any and all
assertions of the right of publicity.").
29. See infra Part II.B-C.
30. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
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nonball" routine, the TV station had violated the man's right of pub-
licity.3' The Court rejected the TV station's argument that the
broadcast was part of a news program, therefore, it was protected by
free speech. 32 The Court was especially persuaded by the fact that the
news program aired the entirety of the performer's act, an entertain-
ment spectacle for which he was ordinarily paid.33 Justice White
wrote, "Wherever the line in particular situations is to be drawn be-
tween media reports that are protected and those that are not, we are
quite sure that the First and Fourteenth Amendments do not immu-
nize the media when they broadcast a performer's entire act without
his consent."34 Obviously, baseball players cannot claim that fantasy
sports appropriate their "entire act" like the television station did to
the human cannonball. Nonetheless, the Zacchini opinion suggests
that free speech rights should be restricted in the face of a counter-
vailing right of publicity.
B. Relevant Case Law
1. The Cardtoons case
Recent case law is more on point with respect to the relevant First
Amendment issues. In Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball
Players Ass'n,35 the Major League Baseball Players' Association
claimed its publicity rights were being violated by Cardtoons' set of
parody trading cards featuring caricatures of MLB players.3 6 The
cards poked fun at things such as the players' names, physical charac-
teristics, and onfield behavior.37 For example, a card portraying Ricky
Henderson, a player notorious for basking in self involvement, read:
Egotisticky Henderson, accepting the 'Me-Me Award' from himself
at the annual 'Egotisticky Henderson Fan Club' banquet, sponsored
by Egotisticky Henderson: 'I would just like to thank myself for all I
have done. (Pause for cheers.) I am the greatest of all time. (Raise
arms triumphantly.) I love myself. (Pause for more cheers.) I am
honored to know me. (Pause for louder cheers.) I wish there were
two of me so I could spend more time with myself. (Wipe tears from
eyes.) I couldn't have done it without me. (Remove cap and hold it
31. Id. at 578-79.
32. Id. at 569.
33. Id. at 574-75.
34. Id.
35. Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n , 95 F.3d 959 (10th Cir. 1996).
36. Id. at 962.
37. Id. at 963.
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aloft.) It's friends like me that keep me going. (Wave to crowd and
acknowledge standing ovation.)38
Each card also printed this disclaimer: "Cardtoons baseball is a par-
ody and is NOT licensed by Major League Baseball Properties or Ma-
jor League Baseball Players Association."3 9
The court recognized an important need to balance publicity rights
with free speech rights, and it created the following legal test: "This
case instead requires us to directly balance the magnitude of the
speech restriction against the asserted governmental interest in pro-
tecting the intellectual property right." 4 () This paper will refer to this
as the "balance of interests" test. Applying this test to the parody
trading cards, the court held that free speech interests were more sig-
nificant than the right of publicity interests.41 In a thorough and
lengthy analysis, the court reasoned that while parody implicates
"some of the core concerns of the First Amendment," 42 the policies of
enforcing publicity rights for baseball players are weak. 43 The court
stated that protectible rights in names on trading cards would not pro-
vide any incentive for the players to perform better.44 The court also
rejected the players' inherent commercial interests in parody, stating
that "there is little right to enjoy the fruits of socially undesirable be-
havior." 45 According to the court, there was no free riding on the
players' fame, because the card manufacturer "is not merely hitching
its wagon to a star. As in all celebrity parodies, Cardtoons added a
significant creative component of its own to the celebrity identity and
created an entirely new product." 46
2. The Gionfriddo case
In Gionfriddo v. Major League Baseball,47 a state appellate court in
California addressed a claim, filed initially as a putative class action on
behalf of retired baseball players against MLB. The suit alleged that
38. Id. Other examples were "Chili Dog Davis" who "plays the game with relish," a parody of
designated hitter Chili Davis; "Cloud Johnson," a parody of 6'10" pitcher Randy Johnson; and a
backflipping "Ozzie Myth," a parody of shortstop Ozzie Smith. Id.
39. Id. at 962. While probably not very significant, this statement at least minimally reduces
the association factor discussed at infra Part I.D.2.
40. Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 972.
41. Id. at 976.
42. Id. at 972.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 974. This is the "incentive rationale," discussed at infra Part I.D.4.
45. Id. at 975-76. The court here attempts to minimize the "commercial interests' factor,
which is discussed at infra Part 1.D.1.
46. Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 976.
47. Gionfriddo v. Major League Baseball, 94 Cal. App. 4th 400 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001).
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MLB had violated retired players' statutory and common law rights of
publicity.48 In enumerating various accomplishments of former base-
ball players on its website, MLB published historical information
about Major League Baseball in the past, including rosters, box
scores, game summaries, lists of award winners, and video clips of his-
toric moments from older games. 49 The website was entirely devoted
to expressive material.50
As in Cardtoons, the court struck a balance of interests: "The First
Amendment requires that the right to be protected from unauthorized
publicity 'be balanced against the public interest in the dissemination
of news and information consistent with the democratic processes
under the constitutional guaranties of freedom of speech and of the
press." 51 Under this framework, the court noted a strong public in-
terest in the game of baseball and an accompanying First Amendment
right for the public to receive newsworthy information pertaining to
the game. 52 The material was expressive and not commercial
speech.53 Conversely, the plaintiffs did not carry their burden of
showing a significant countervailing economic interest in their public-
ity rights. 4 The court stated that the material might even boost the
retired players' marketability.55
3. The Doe case
One final case bearing on the issue is Doe v. TCI Cablevision,56
where the Missouri Supreme Court addressed a claim by hockey "en-
forcer" Tony Twist that the comic book Spawn was infringing his pub-
licity rights.57 The writer of the comic book admitted that one of his
characters, Antonio Twistelli, a Mafia don whose list of evil deeds in-
cluded multiple murders and abduction of children, was based on real
48. Id. at 406. The CBC case thus presents a flip of positions for the players, who just five
years prior argued against enforceable publicity rights in a somewhat similar context in Gion-
friddo. In CBC, MLB Advanced Media makes in many respects directly opposite arguments
than it did in Gionfriddo.
49. Id. at 405.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 409 (quoting Gill v. Hearst Publ'g Co., 40 Cal. 2d 224, 228 (1953).
52. Id. at 411.
53. Gionfriddo, 94 Cal. App. 4th at 412.
54. Id. at 415. "Balancing plaintiffs' negligible economic interests against the public's endur-
ing fascination with baseball's past, we conclude that the public interest favoring the free dissem-
ination of information regarding baseball's history far outweighs any proprietary interests at
stake.' Id.
55. Id.
56. Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363 (Mo. 2003).
57. Id. at 367.
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life Tony Twist. 8 The hockey player and the fictional character
shared little in common outside of the name similarities and vague
notions of a tough-guy persona.59
The court noted the tension between the First Amendment and
publicity rights, 61 eventually settling on the "predominant purpose"
test:
If a product is being sold that predominantly exploits the commer-
cial value of an individual's identity, that product should be held to
violate the right of publicity and not be protected by the First
Amendment, even if there is some "expressive" content in it that
might qualify as "speech' in other circumstances. If, on the other
hand, the predominant purpose of the product is to make an expres-
sive comment on or about a celebrity, the expressive values could
be given greater weight.61
The court concluded that the predominant purpose of a reference to
Twist was commercial in nature. Because there was no commentary
about Twist himself, the inclusion of his identity was mainly a ploy to
sell comic books.62 Thus, Twist's right of publicity was violated. 63
C. Choosing the Legal Standard
One important distinction among each of these three cases is the
different legal tests used in squaring the competing rights. 6 4 Under
Doe's "predominant purpose" test, the players have a very strong
case.69 The predominant purpose of using MLB players in fantasy
sports seems more commercial than expressive; fantasy baseball is a
58. Id. at 366.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 373.
61. Doe, 110 S.w.3d at 374.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Besides these two frameworks, many other legal tests have been put forth attempting to
solve this problem. Little consensus has been reached. The "transformative test" of California,
often applied to cases involving artistic work, looks to "what is essentially a balancing test be-
tween the First Amendment and the right of publicity based on whether the work in question
adds significant creative elements so as to be transformed into something more than a mere
celebrity likeness or imitation." Comedy III Prod., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 25 Cal. 4th 387,
391 (2001). The "relatedness test" of the Restatement of Unfair Competition looks says, "Use of
a name or likeness in connection with news or entertainment may be actionable if the use is not
sufficiently related to the underlying work." RESTAI EMEN1, supra note 14, § 47 cmt. c.
65. Not surprisingly, in the CBC case MLB Advanced Media urged that Doe was controlling
Missouri authority. Major League Baseball Players Association's Reply Brief in Support of Mo-
tion for Summary Judgment, Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary
Judgment, and Response to Amicus Brief at 28-29, C.B.C. Distrib. and Mktg., Inc. v. Major
League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P., 443 F. Supp. 2d 1077 (E.D. Mo. 2006) (No. 4:05-cv-
00252-MLM).
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game for a fee. Fantasy sports providers use the statistics to make
their games more marketable, not to serve the public interest.
However, the predominant purpose test has been heavily criticized
for the potential to produce erratic results6 6 and chill artistic expres-
sion.67 Also, the test was developed in a case dealing with expressive
artistic activity rather than news reporting.68 While it was a feasible
framework to apply Doe's facts, it does not smoothly import into
other contexts.69 In regards to the CBC case, even though the test was
adopted by the Missouri Supreme Court, basic principles of federal-
ism establish that the holding of a state court is not binding on a fed-
eral court with respect to federal issues.70
The test that should be used for fantasy sports is the "balance of
interests" test of Cardtoons and Gionfriddo. Many courts, including
the Eighth Circuit in CBC, have used this test in one form or an-
other,7' and it seems to be the best standard for a case involving news
dissemination. 72 Moreover, the cases most similar to fantasy sports
have invoked this test.7 3 Thus, as it bears on fantasy baseball, the pub-
lic's interest in receiving newsworthy statistical information should be
weighed against the players' interest in securing their right of
publicity.
D. Interests of the Players
To balance the interests, we must first identify them. Historically,
courts have identified several policy goals in favor of enforcing the
right of publicity, and the case law accounts for much of their growth
66. Jason K. Levine, Can the Right of Publicity Afford Free Speech? A New Right of Publicity
Test for First Amendment Cases, 27 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT L.J. 171, 220-21 (2004). It is diffi-
cult to determine exactly what is expressive and what is commercial; the distinction is not made
easily. Id.
67. Michael S. Kruse, Missouri's Interfacing of the First Amendment and the Right of Publicity:
Is the Predominant Purpose" Test Really That Desirable?, 69 Mo. L. REV. 799, 816 (2004).
68. See Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363 (Mo. 2003).
69. Kruse, supra note 67, at 815-16.
70. McCreary v. Sigler, 406 F.2d 1264, 1268 (8th Cir. 1969).
71. See, e.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977) (evaluating and
balancing economic interests); ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ'g, Inc. 332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003)
(evaluating and balancing free speech in relation to prints of Tiger Woods); Estate of Presley v.
Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339, 1356 (D. N.J. 1981) (evaluating and balancing social benefits); Winter
v. DC Comics, 134 Cal. Rptr. 2d 634, (2003) (evaluating and balancing free speech interests
regarding a book with characters that resembled two popular musicians).
72. Most of the other tests are particularized for artistic and expressive activity: factual news
reporting has different interests at stake.
73. See supra Parts II.B.1, II.B.2.
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and refinement.74 Two policy goals-protecting the commercial value
of natural property rights and preventing damage to goodwill-are
the most convincing justifications in the context of fantasy sports, and
they form the basis of the players' interests. There are other fre-
quently cited rationales-economic allocational efficiency and celeb-
rity incentives-that are less persuasive in this context. All will be
addressed in this section.7 5
1. Commercial interests from natural property rights
Broadly speaking, right of publicity laws confer on every person
property rights to control the commercial use of his identity.76 They
are designed in part to protect commercial interests, or the "loss of the
financial rewards flowing from the economic value of a human iden-
tity," and thus prevent unjust enrichment.77 This rationale is based
upon natural rights and has been referred to as a moral rationale.78
The premise is that one's identity is inherently his own property, and
all income generated through it belongs to the rightful owner.79 Be-
cause the right of publicity is derived from property law, it bestows on
its owners rights in the "bundle of sticks," including the right to ex-
clude and the right to derive income.so Nimmer famously wrote, "It
would seem to be a first principle of Anglo-American jurisprudence,
an axiom of the most fundamental nature, that every person is entitled
to the fruit of his labors unless there are important countervailing
public policy considerations."8 1 A celebrity or athlete who is able to
market his persona is afforded the opportunity to preserve the full
74. See Jonathan L. Faber & Wesley A. Zirkle, Spreading Its Wings and Coming of Age: With
Indiana's Law as a Model, the State-Based Right of Publicity is Ready to Move to the Federal
Level, REs GESTAE, Nov. 2001, at 33.
75. All of the policy goals identified in favor of right of publicity laws have come under criti-
cism in one form or another. Although outside the scope of this paper, more treatment on these
issues can be found at Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and
Publicity Rights, 81 CAL. L. REV. 127 (1993); Lee Goldman, Elvis is Alive, but he Shouldn't Be:
The Right of Publicity Revisited, 1992 B.Y.U. L. REV. 597 (1992): Diane Leenheer Zimmerman,
Fitting Publicity Rights into Intellectual Property and Free Speech Theory: Sam, You Made the
Pants Too Long!, 10 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. 283 (2000).
76. MCCARTHY, supra note 9, § 3:1.
77. Id. § 2:2.
78. Gloria Franke, The Right of Publicity vs. The First Amendment: Will One Test Ever Cap-
ture the Starring Role?, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 945, 954 (2006).
79. Id.
80. See generally Myrl L. Duncan. Reconceiving the Bundle of Sticks: Land as a Community-
Based Resource, 32 ENvrL. L. 773, 774-75 (2002).
81. Melville B. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 203, 216 (1954).
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commercial value of his fame, as well as prevent others from free rid-
ing on that value."'
In 1953, Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum8 3 was the
first case to coin the phrase "right of publicity."8 4 The court's reason-
ing for creating this new right rested strongly upon moral and natural
rights.85 "[I]t is common knowledge that many prominent persons
(especially actors and ballplayers), far from having their feelings
bruised through public exposure of their likeness, would feel sorely
deprived if they no longer received money for authorizing advertise-
ments .... " 86
2. Autonomous self-definition to protect goodwill
A second justification is to protect a person's right to autonomous
self-definition and personal dignity. Mark. P. McKenna wrote:
Because the things with which individuals choose to associate reflect
the way they wish to be perceived, unauthorized uses of one's iden-
tity in connection with products or services threatens to define that
individual to the world. There are costs to whatever meaning we
project, and those costs are borne uniquely by the individual.87
If the right to provide fantasy baseball becomes common property,
any number of poor quality leagues could flood the industry.88 This
might impact the goodwill that MLB players have achieved over the
years. For example, the players currently have the right to control
who may produce MLB-based trading cards and video games.89
These exclusive contracts allow the players to develop their goodwill
by ensuring that their names appear only on products and services
that meet their approval.9to MLB as a whole has a significant interest
in being connected only to superior services. Intentional or not, every
association that is made between MLB and another entity impacts the
public perception of the league, and the right of publicity is meant to
offer some control over these perceptions.
82. See RESrATEMENT, supra note 14, § 46 (1995).
83. Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953).
84. Faber & Zirkle, supra note 74, at 33.
85. Haelan, 202 F.2d at 868.
86. Id.
87. Mark P. McKenna, The Right of Publicity and Autonomous Self-Definition, 67 U. PrrT. L.
REV. 225, 294 (2005).
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3. Economic allocational efficiency
It is classic micro-economic theory that while common property en-
courages wasteful overuse, private property ensures that users of re-
sources pay the full cost of their activities.91 Economists argue that
publicity rights are an efficient way of allocating valuable celebrity
personas. If unlimited access is permitted to a celebrity's likeness, its
value would diminish as more and more advertisers exploited it to
attract attention to their products. 9 2 This harms the celebrity, who
loses licensing fees, as well as members of the public, who tire of the
celebrity and lose enjoyment they might otherwise derive from his
talents.93
For instance, the singer Tom Waits has a distinctively gravelly way
of singing that many people associate with him alone . . . . Frito-Lay
found a Tom Waits sound-alike and produced a TV commercial for
Doritos corn chips with this person singing the voice-over in Waits's
distinctive style. Even Waits's friends were fooled. When he sued,
the court entered judgment on the jury's $2.4 million verdict. Ana-
lyzing the result much as an economist would, Waits declared, "Now
I have a fence around my larynxization."
Waits's distinctive singing style is partly a public good. When a tele-
vision viewer enjoys the soundtrack for the unauthorized Doritos
commercial she does not thereby prevent another fan from enjoying
Waits's actual voice on an album . . . . Nevertheless, Waits's distinc-
tive singing style is not a pure public good, because in some ranges
of use-intensive ones-more commercials using Waits's voice tire
his public of it and reduce its enjoyment of his artistic works. Unless
Waits has his fence, free riders, such as Frito-Lay, could produce so
many low-valued works that they would crowd out higher-valued
ones.94
This rationale applies to advertising, but likely not to fantasy sports.
If all fantasy leagues were permitted to operate without paying licens-
ing fees, it is true that more fantasy businesses would be in operation.
But it is difficult to envision a scenario in which the sheer volume of
fantasy providers on the market tires the public of baseball players in
the same way the public would tire of Waits's voice. Advertising is a
pervasive medium that bombards a captive audience with coercive
messages. It is no wonder that after hearing repeated Doritos com-
mercials, the public might grow weary of Waits's voice and lose inter-
91. Madow, supra note 75, at 220. See also RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIc ANALYSIS OF
THE LAw 31 (3d ed. 1986).
92. Mark F. Grady, A Positive Economic Theory of the Right of PublicitY, I UCLA ENT. L.
REv. 97, 100 (1994).
93. See id. at 101.
94. Id. (footnotes omitted).
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est in his music. In contrast, fantasy sports operate remotely on the
Internet. Consumers merely choose one league and play out a season,
checking and updating their teams as they please. They would not
even be aware of a flooded market, nor would it make any difference
to their level of enjoyment.
4. Incentive to enter the public limelight
The "incentive rationale" states that people should be given an eco-
nomic incentive to engage in activities that enrich the public.95 But
while the performances of top-notch athletes certainly can enrich the
public, the quality of athletic achievement likely does not depend on
enforceable publicity rights. Given the high salaries of professional
athletes, the competitive nature of sports, and an independent desire
for fame, it seems doubtful that publicity rights encourage athletes to
compete at a higher level.9 6 The Tenth Circuit has flatly rejected the
incentive rationale in most situations: "The extra income generated by
licensing one's identity does not provide a necessary inducement to
enter and achieve in the realm of sports and entertainment."9 7 In-
stead, the incentive rationale applies best to one limited area: non-
copyrightable performances by entertainers. An example is the
human cannonball in Zacchini, who presumably would not put on
such entertainment spectacles for free.
E. Interests of the Public
Of course, the public also has interests at stake. While the First
Amendment furthers several free speech goals,9 8 the one that con-
cerns this case is the "enlightenment function"-the theory that each
member of the public should have access to all facts and data in order
to form his own opinions and make informed choices. 99 The constitu-
tional guarantees of free speech and a free press curtail the govern-
ment's ability to impose content-based burdens on speech that could
drive certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace.100 The First
Amendment is "designed and intended to remove governmental re-
95. MCCARTHY, supra note 9, § 2:6.
96. This is a common criticism. "The commercial value of a person's identity often results
from success in endeavors such as entertainment or sports that offer their own substantial re-
wards. Any additional incentive attributable to the right of publicity may have only marginal
significance.' RESTATEMENT, supra note 14, § 46 cmt. c (1995).
97. Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 95 F.3d 959, 973 (10th Cir. 1996).
98. RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH §§ 1.02- 1.04 (2007).
99. MCCARTHY, supra note 9, § 8:3.
100. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105 (1991).
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straints from the arena of public discussion . . . ."1or Although one
commentator has argued that baseball statistics fall outside the ambit
of the First Amendment,102 the better view is that the statistics are in
fact "speech" because they educate the public about the most recent
happenings of America's pastime.
Baseball is a unique matter of public concern; baseball statistics are
newsworthy information contributing to public discussion. The statis-
tics have been viewed as bits of baseball's history.10 3 Even the Su-
preme Court has acknowledged baseball's enduring value in a flowery
opinion by Justice Blackmun:"1' 4 "Then there are the many names, cel-
ebrated for one reason or another, that have sparked the diamond and
its environs and that have provided tinder for recaptured thrills, for
reminiscence and comparisons, and for conversation and anticipation
in-season and off-season." 0 5
To be sure, political discourse, political news, and political opinions
are the most protected forms of speech."o6 Sports statistics do not
quite rise to the same level." 7 Still, because baseball is such a ubiqui-
tous institution in American culture, the public has a legitimate inter-
est in receiving updates about the current happenings in the game.
The court in Gionfriddo stated it well:
Major league baseball is followed by millions of people across this
country on a daily basis ... The public has an enduring fascination
in the records set by former players and in memorable moments
from previous games . The records and statistics remain of inter-
est to the public because they provide context that allows fans to
better appreciate (or deprecate) today's performances.os
101. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971).
102. Karcher. supra note 8, at 581-82. This article understates the public importance of daily
reports of baseball statistics.
103. C.B.C. Distrib. and Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P., 443 F.
Supp. 2d 1077, 1093 (E.D. Mo. 2006) (quoting Gionfriddo v. Major League Baseball, 94 Cal.
App. 4th 400, 410 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001)).
1()4. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 262 (1972).
105. Id.
106. MUCARTHY, supra note 9, § 8:12.
107. According to Professor McCarthy:
Within the category of "news," information about the political process is at the highest level of
First Amendment protection. Other forms of "news" may receive a slightly more attenuated
form of constitutional solicitude. For example, "news" about what the latest rock music star eats
for dinner or what fashions in wearing apparel are "in" this season do not, and should not,
receive exactly the same degree of constitutional immunity from the law as political "news."
Id. at § 8:13.
108. Gionfriddo, 94 Cal. App. 4th at 411.
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No court would consider a challenge to the right to publish Major
League statistics,to9 and every major news source in the country pro-
vides daily baseball updates.
F Balancing the Interests
On balance, however, the free speech interests must yield. While
the publishing of daily statistics is a valuable contribution to the pub-
lic, fantasy sports leagues do more than just publish. They manage
and reorganize the players' statistics, spinning them into an amusing
game for which the public will pay to play. This is more than just
educating baseball fans about what is currently happening in the
league. It goes a step beyond contribution to the public discussion
forum; it is not a mere repackaging of bare numbers.
Free speech only shields news distribution to a certain point. The
First Amendment may give publishers a constitutional right to dissem-
inate statistics and Americans the right to receive them, but it does
not confer the right to operate a commercial enterprise that happens
to be based on dissemination of those statistics. To allow fantasy
providers a First Amendment defense would be to allow a violation of
the players' rights merely because the violation is accompanied by
newsworthy information.1 10 The mere presence of up-to-date statis-
tics in fantasy sports should not automatically shelter the use of the
players' names. "The first amendment is not a license to trammel on
legally recognized rights in intellectual property.""'
It must be emphasized that it is not the profit-seeking nature of
fantasy leagues that removes them from the First Amendment's reach.
Speech that is sold is speech nonetheless; and plenty of Supreme
Court precedent has established this principle.1 12 Newspapers and tel-
evision news programs are among the most protectible forms of
speech despite their generation of income.' 1 3 It must also be empha-
sized that it is not the entertaining nature of fantasy leagues that
109. See Carlisle v. Fawcett Publ'ns, Inc., 201 Cal. App. 2d 733. 746-47 (Cal. Ct. App. 1962)
("Certainly, the accomplishments . .. of those who have achieved a marked reputation or notori-
ety by appearing before the public such as actors and actresses, professional athletes, public of-
ficers, may legitimately be mentioned and discussed in print or on radio and television.")
(emphasis added).
110. For an analogous argument inside the trademark realm, see National Football League
Props. v. Playoff Corp., 808 F. Supp. 1288, 1294 (N.D. Tex. 1992).
111. Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Scoreboard Posters, Inc., 600 F.2d 1184 (5th Cir.
1979).
112. See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 396-97 (1967) ("'That books, newspapers, and
magazines are published and sold for profit does not prevent them from being a form of expres-
sion whose liberty is safeguarded by the First Amendment."') (internal citations omitted).
113. Id.
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removes them from the First Amendment's reach. Again, the Su-
preme Court has reiterated this numerous times, 114 and it is clear that
entertaining plays, movies, cartoons, and parodies enjoy broad
protection. 15
Rather, the reason free speech does not apply to fantasy sports is
that it impinges on publicity rights where that impingement is unnec-
essary. When the Zacchini opinion spoke of the "line in particular
situations . . . to be drawn between media reports that are protected
and those that are not,"'16 it recognized other rights in tension with
free speech rights that need to be resolved through a careful balancing
act. Because Zacchini owned a right of publicity in his human can-
nonball performance, the Court weakened the news program's First
Amendment protection to broadcast the man's performance. Analo-
gizing, it seems that where the baseball players own publicity rights,
free speech defenses must be carefully monitored so as not to unnec-
essarily carve out portions of the players' natural property rights. The
First Amendment is designed to protect against the elimination of in-
formation from the marketplace of ideas. If baseball fans across the
country can already receive MLB statistical updates through straight
news reporting,' 1 7 then their interest in receiving that same informa-
tion from fantasy baseball is weak.
Conversely, the players have a strong interest in controlling their
personas. As stated above," the players are entitled some degree of
control over how their identities are used in public, particularly when
others are profiting from them. The most important stick in the bun-
dle of rights is the right to exclude,'' 9 and the players have a legiti-
mate interest in overseeing how their names and daily performances
are used by other businesses.
Regarding existing case law, Gionfriddo is distinguishable because
it dealt with standard news dissemination and historical facts in the
model of ordinary media outlets. The website in that case was educa-
tional and informative, and nothing more. It did not set up a competi-
tion that relied on the identities of others; it was simply an
114. See, e.g., Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 95 F.3d 959, 969 (10th
Cir. 1996) ("Speech that entertains, like speech that informs, is protected under the First
Amendment.").
115. Id.
116. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 574-75 (1977).
117. The internet in particular has created almost instantaneous reporting. Websites such as
http://espn.go.com, http://sports.yahoo.com, and others provide real time updates on almost all
professional sporting events.
118. See supra Part ll.D.2.
119. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 433 (1982).
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enlightening tribute to baseball players of the past. Likewise,
Cardtoons is distinguishable because it involved parody. Unlike
names and statistics, a particular parody is unique, and the satirical
nature of its message cannot be obtained through other, less commer-
cially exploitive means. Parody is highly expressive and contains so-
cially useful messages.
III. THE RULING OF CBC v. MLB ADVANCED MEDIA
The recent CBC case was the first court ruling on this issue. Like
this note, the court used the balance of interests test; however, the
court arrived at a different ultimate conclusion. While I respectfully
disagree with the court, there is room for argument. Right of publicity
laws are written in broad and imprecise terms. When they are bal-
anced against the (broad and imprecise) First Amendment, they be-
come even more pliable. One commentator has noted:
A random walk through any modern casebook in constitutional law
will discover the extent to which the First Amendment has been
fragmented and scattered virtually out of sight . . . . In a large and
growing number of tort related cases, the tendency is to address
each new dispute simply as another exercise in conventional cost-
benefit terms.120
As a result, cases like this are often result-oriented. It is easy for a
court or commentator to interpret the language in different ways, ref-
erence some policy goals yet conceal others, and eventually reach an
outcome that was decided in advance. Nonetheless, my objective here
is to be critical of a few aspects of the court's opinion that influenced
its ruling.
A. Case Summary
C.B.C. Distribution and Marketing (CBC) was a typical provider of
fantasy sports. 12 1 Participants played out fantasy seasons where they
acted as pseudo-General Managers of baseball teams, assembling
teams they hoped would perform well.122 The participants paid a
baseline fee to play the game as well as additional fees to trade players
during the season. 123 From 1995 to 2004, CBC operated under a li-
120. See William W. Van Alstyne, First Amendment Limitations on Recovery from the
Press-An Extended Comment on "The Anderson Solution", 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 795, 818
(1984).
121. See C.B.C. Distrib. and Mktg., Inc., v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P., 505
F.3d 818, 820 (8th Cir. 2007).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 821.
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cense from the MLB Players' Association, who asserted ownership
over the players' names and statistics.124 Then in 2005, the Players'
Association licensed these rights in an exclusive contract to MLB Ad-
vanced Media (MLBAM), the interactive media and internet arm of
MLB.125 Shut out of the exclusive deal and afraid of being sued if it
continued to operate, CBC brought suit in the Eastern District of Mis-
souri, seeking a ruling that the players did not own cognizable right of
publicity interests with respect to the fantasy baseball industry.126
The lawsuit was filed in the federal court system, but the right of
publicity is a law of the states. 127 The Missouri Supreme Court set out
the elements of a right of publicity action as follows: "(1) The defen-
dant used plaintiff's name as a symbol of his identity (2) without con-
sent (3) and with the intent to obtain a commercial advantage."1 28
Following Missouri Law, the district court in CBC held that the play-
ers did not own a right of publicity for various reasons: the "identity"
element of the claim was not satisfied;129 the "commercial advantage"
element of the claim was not satisfied;3t 1 and, in any case, the First
Amendment provided an affirmative defense.' 3 '
MLBAM appealed. 132 While the district court's reasoning was
somewhat inane for its holding on the identity 33 and commercial ad-




127. MCCARTHY, Supra note 9, § 1:3.
128. Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363, 375 (Mo. 2003).
129. C.B.C. Distrib. and Mktg., Inc., v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P., 443 F.
Supp. 2d 1077, 1088 (E.D. Mo. 2006).
130. Id. at 1086.
131. Id. at 1091-92.
132. C.B.C. Distrib. and Mktg., Inc., v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P., 505
F.3d 818, 821 (8th Cir. 2007).
133. The district court said that there must be a reference to personas beyond the mere listing
of names. CB.C., 443 F. Supp. 2d at 1089. The court said that CBC's website "does not involve
character, personality, reputation, or physical appearance of the players: it simply involves his-
torical facts about the baseball players such as their batting averages, home runs, doubles, tri-
ples, etc." Id. However, a symbol of one's identity should be something that references a
specific person as an individual, not something that references distinguishing characteristics
about him. See MCCARTHY, supra note 9, § 3:7.
134. The district court said that that "commercial advantage" means only that the advantage
must have been gained by attracting consumer attention to a product in a marketing or advertis-
ing sense. C.B.C, 443 F. Supp. 2d at 1086. This rule is overly narrow. A more logical interpreta-
tion is that "commercial advantage" refers to an advantage over companies who are not already
using the players' identities. Likewise, the Restatement takes a broader approach to the com-
mercial advantage element, stating there is liability when the name is "used in connection with
the services rendered by the user." RrSTATEMENi. supra note 14, § 47 (1995). To illustrate,
imagine a profit-seeking fantasy league based on the Chicago Park District annual coed spring
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jected that portion of the opinion.135 More importantly, and more
pertinent to this discussion, the Eighth Circuit then turned to the free
speech aspect of the case and concluded that the First Amendment
did in fact shield the fantasy provider.' 3 6 The court determined that
the First Amendment interests had more weight than the right of pub-
licity interests.'
The court downplayed the interests of the players. 38  First, the
court said that all of the information in fantasy baseball is already in
the "public domain," and it would be a "strange law" to prohibit usage
of it.' 1 Next, the court rejected economic interests of the players be-
cause the players are separately rewarded for their endeavors." The
court also said that there is no danger of consumers being misled be-
cause the game is based on MLB in its entirety, thus eliminating the
implication that any particular player with star power might be en-
dorsing the fantasy league.141 Finally, the court rejected non-mone-
tary interests, saying that any emotional harm would be caused by the
media, not fantasy baseball, and in any event, non-monetary interests
are better addressed through the right of privacy.14 2
Meanwhile, the court emphasized the free speech interests of the
public.14 3 The court reiterated that the bare facts and figures of fan-
tasy baseball are indeed "speech."1 4 4 The court then stated the public
importance of the statistics, saying that millions of people across the
2007 softball tournament. It is not hard to see why the names and statistics of Major League
Baseball players enhance the attractiveness of a fantasy baseball league, conferring a hefty com-
mercial advantage.
135. The district court also erred on its copyright preemption holding. Almost all courts have
held publicity rights to be outside the scope of copyright. See, e.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard
Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977); Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir.1992): Factors
Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 652 F.2d 278 (2d Cir. 1981); Bi-Rite Enters., Inc. v. Button Master,
555 F. Supp. 1188 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y.
1975). But see Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 805 F.2d 663 (7th
Cir.1986); Motown Record Corp. v. George A. Hormel & Co., 657 F. Supp. 1236 (C.D.Cal.1987).
"Under the majority rule, there is no federal copyright preemption of the state law right of
publicity because the right of publicity protects human identity, which is not subject matter cov-
ered by federal copyright law." MCCARTHY, supra note 9, § 11:50.
136. C.B.C., 505 F.3d at 824.
137. Id. at 823.
138. Id. at 824 ("In addition, the facts in this case barely, if at all, implicate the interests that
states typically intend to vindicate by providing rights of publicity to individuals.").
139. Id. at 823.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 824.
142. CB.C, 505 F.3d at 824.
143. Id. at 823-24.
144. Id. at 823.
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country have an enduring fascination with the game.14 5 These inter-
ests, according to the court, carried significant weight.14 6
B. A Critical Analysis
Much of the court's analysis was erroneous. Besides overstating the
free speech interests and understating the right of publicity interests,
the court also used two common arguments, which I will call "public
domain" and "existing wealth," that should not have been relevant.
1. Public Domain
First, the court invoked the overused (and misunderstood) public
domain argument:
[S]tate law rights of publicity must be balanced against first amend-
ment considerations . . . . First, the information used in CBC's fan-
tasy baseball games is all readily available in the public domain, and
it would be strange law that a person would not have a first amend-
ment right to use information that is available to everyone.147
We must be careful with the term "public domain." Public domain
is a legal conclusion-a label-that applies to information that is not
protected by intellectual property rights, or in this case, publicity
rights.14 8 Thus, it could be said that the entire issue in this case comes
down to whether the players' names and statistics are considered to be
in the public domain. The term "public domain" belongs in the hold-
ing, not the reasoning.
By using the term how it did, however, the court seems only to have
meant that the names and statistics are readily available. In other
145. Id. One final issue adjudicated by the court was a no-challenge provision in the contract.
The fantasy provider agreed not to "dispute or attack the title or any rights of Players' Associa-
tion in and to the Rights and/or the Trademarks or the validity of the license granted," i.e. a no-
challenge provision. Id. at 824. The court rejected the no-challenge provision as a breach of
warranty because the Players' Association claimed that it "is the sole and exclusive holder of all
right, title and interest" in the names and statistics, which is was not. Id. at 825. Because it was a
condition on which the fantasy provider relied, the contractual obligations were lifted. Id.
146. Id. at 824.
147. Id. at 823 (internal citations omitted).
148. Black's Law dictionary defines "public domain" as follows:
[t]he universe of inventions and creative works that are not protected by intellectual-
property rights and are therefore available for anyone to use without charge. When
copyright, trademark, patent, or trade-secret rights are lost or expire, the intellectual
property they had protected becomes part of the public domain and can be appropri-
ated by anyone without liability for infringement.
BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 1027 (8th ed. 2005). Professor McCarthy writes that "public domain
is the status of an invention, creative work, commercial symbol, or any other creation that is not
protected by any form of intellectual property." J. THOMAS MUCARTHY, M(CARIHY ON
TRADEMARKS AND) UNFAIR COMPETITION § 1:2 (4th ed. 2007).
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words, anyone with an internet connection or seventy-five cents for a
newspaper can obtain the statistics, view them, show them to others,
or make copies of them. But even so, it is not clear why this should be
a reason to deny the statistics intellectual property protection.149
Contrary to the court's assertion, it is not a "strange law"'o that a
person should be prohibited from using readily available information
in other ways. The entire bodies of copyright law and patent law are
based on exactly this premise. For example, newspapers are littered
with news articles, editorials, and pictures of celebrities, politicians,
and athletes; but copyright law forbids any reproduction without con-
sent. Intellectual property law reflects the assumption that in order to
further certain policy goals, some readily available information should
be protected from unauthorized appropriation. The touchstone is not
the public availability of the information; it is simply whether it is
good policy to protect that information.
2. Existing Wealth
Second, in rejecting the players' commercial interests, the court
used their existing wealth against them:
Economic interests that states seek to promote include the right of
an individual to reap the rewards of his or her endeavors and an
individual's right to earn a living . . . . But major league baseball
players are rewarded, and handsomely, too, for their participation
in games and can earn additional large sums from endorsements
and sponsorship arrangements.' 5 1
Should the court deny a property right to a group of individuals
because they are well-to-do? It is uncommon, to say the least, to as-
sess a person's affluence in deciding whether he is entitled to intellec-
tual property rights. Bill Gates is not held to a higher standard when
his company applies for patents; Paul McCartney can copyright any
song he writes.
True, unlike Gates and McCartney, a high-salaried ballplayer is not
more likely to enrich the public further as a result of the additional
incentive of exclusive property rights.152 But few people take the "in-
centive rationale" seriously, especially for high profile athletes. 5 3
There are more important interests here-commercial gain, unjust en-
richment, protection of goodwill-that have nothing to do with the
149. This is a common argument, but it does not square with the most basic principles of
intellectual property.
150. C.B.C., 505 F.3d at 823.
151. C.B.C., 505 F.3d at 824.
152. See supra Part II.D.4.
153. See id.
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players' affluence. The court should not have used salaries and en-
dorsement opportunities as a reason to deny rights of publicity to the
players. 154
3. Implied Associations
Finally, the court rejected MLB's right to limit its association with
fantasy baseball leagues:
Other motives for creating a publicity right are . . . to protect con-
sumers from misleading advertising . . . . [There is no] danger here
that consumers will be misled, because the fantasy baseball games
depend on the inclusion of all players and thus cannot create a false
impression that some particular player with "star power" is endors-
ing CBC's products.' 5 5
This is a narrow view on the effects of associations that are visible to
the public. Instead of focusing on how MLB chooses to define itself
to the world,' 5 6 the court looked only at individualized false advertis-
ing endorsements. Taking the court's argument to its logical conclu-
sion, it would seem to imply that as the number of appropriated
celebrity personas increases, the likelihood of liability decreases. In-
stead, if fantasy providers are using the identities of all MLB players
on a league-wide basis, we must look at associations that are created
on that level. MLB as a whole, its brand, its trademarks, its logos, and
its players are all viewed in connection with third party fantasy provid-
ers over which it has no control.
C. Other Interesting Arguments
1. The Jeopardy Hypothetical
One of the fantasy provider's more interesting arguments on the
district court level was that if the players won this case, then presuma-
bly traditional quiz games like Jeopardy and Trivial Pursuit could not
ask questions about celebrities without facing liability.' 57  Fantasy
baseball, however, is different. While quiz games like Jeopardy use
MLB references in only a small subset of questions, fantasy sports use
154. For more on this argument, see Brief of Amici Curiae NBA Props., Inc. et al. as Amici
Curiae Supporting Petitioners. C.B.C. Distrib. and Mktg., Inc., v. Major League Baseball Ad-
vanced Media, L.P., 505 F.3d 818 (Nos. 06-3357, 06-3358), at 6 ("The district court's decision
reflects the erroneous belief that the weight to be accorded the state's interest in protecting
intellectual property rights depends on the value of those rights to their owner.").
155. C.B.C., 505 F.3d at 824.
156. See supra Part II.D.2.
157. CBC's Reply Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment Against
MLBAM at 9. C B.C. Distrib. and 1ktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P.,
443 F. Supp. 2d 1077 (E.D. Mo. 2006) (No. 4:05-cv-00252-MLM).
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the players as the entire basis for their game. Baseball card producers
and video game manufacturers alike, industries whose entire product
lines are based on MLB, have for years paid licensing fees to MLB,
while Jeopardy has not.'5 8
Where the extent of the use of the players' names is de minimis, the
players should not have enforceable publicity rights. This is supported
by both case law' 59 and the Restatement, which excludes from liability
the use of another's identity "in advertising that is incidental to such
uses."16 1 Fantasy baseball wholly depends on Major League players,
and the use of their names is pervasive, not incidental. Mere inciden-
tal uses do not implicate the core concerns of the law. Athletes do not
have a significant commercial stake in a quiz game that references
them infrequently among a broad array of topics, nor is there a risk of
implied associations between MLB and the quiz games.' 6 1
2. The Board Game cases
Finally, I would like to address one argument put forth by MLBAM
that highlights the free speech issues of this case. In its briefs,
MLBAM relied on two older cases that are similar to fantasy sports.
First, Palmer v. Schonhornl62 involved a board game that simulated
professional golf tournaments through the use of dice and charts
based on the past performances of famous golfers.' 6 3 The game con-
tained "Profile and Playing Charts" that listed the names of each of
the golfers along with accurate biographical profiles.16 4 The Superior
Court of New Jersey held that the game manufacturer could not use
the names of the golfers without their permission.' 6 5 The decision was
significant because games of this type were common at the time, and
the judge's decision prompted most of the leading game manufactur-
ers to purchase official licenses.' 6 6
One of those manufacturers refused, which led to the second case.
Negamco, a family-run company in Minnesota, sold a somewhat so-
158. Id. See also Karcher, supra note 8, at 570.
159. See, e.g., Ruffin-Steinback v. dePasse, 267 F.3d 457, 461-62 (6th Cir. 2001); Titan Sports,
Inc. v. Comics World Corp., 870 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1989).
160. RESTATEMENT, supra note 14, § 47 (1995) (emphasis added).
161. In my view, a trivia game based entirely on MLB would likely be a right of publicity
violation.
162. Palmer v. Schonhorn, 232 A.2d 458 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1967).
163. Id. at 459.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. J. Gordon Hylton, The Major League Baseball Players Association and the Ownership of
Sports Statistics: The Untold Story of Round One, 17 MARQ. SPORTs L. REV. 87, 96-97 (2006).
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phisticated version of a baseball simulation board game.' 67 The game
included statistical profile cards for eleven pitchers and fifteen posi-
tion players for each of the twenty major league teams.'68 The game
allowed its users to make a baseball game's typical managerial deci-
sions and then simulate the results of those decisions based upon the
statistical profiles.'69 In Uhlaender v. Hendricksen,170 a federal district
court in Minnesota held that the players owned a right of publicity in
the commercial use of their names and accomplishments.17 1
Despite many factual similarities to fantasy baseball, Palmer and
Uhlaender ultimately should have little to no effect on the free speech
aspect of the case. First, neither court even made mention of the First
Amendment. Palmer was decided in 1963, Uhlaender in 1970, and
Zacchini in 1977. To the extent that Zacchini bears on the fantasy
sports dispute, it is clear that the First Amendment can conflict with
right of publicity laws. Second, right of publicity law was only begin-
ning to form in the 1960s.172 The body of law was not well developed,
and neither the parties nor judges had prior experience with the na-
ture of the claim. For example, the defendant in the Uhlaender case
argued "that there is nothing offensive nor demeaning about the way
the names are used," 73 which is a defense that would be relevant to
an invasion of privacy claim (tort), but not a right of publicity claim
(property). The case presented an issue of first impression to the Min-
nesota court, and most courts at the time were still inclined to think in
terms of privacy rights rather than publicity rights.174 Third, the board
game makers in those cases had a weaker free speech interest than
fantasy providers because unlike fantasy sports, board games do not
provide up-to-date statistics similar to news reporting.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 97-98.
170. Uhlaender v. Hendricksen. 316 F. Supp. 1277 (D. Minn. 1970). For a fascinating behind-
the-scenes view of this litigation, see Hylton, supra note 166, at 96-105. Plaintiff Ted Uhlaender
was a Minnesota Twins outfielder who filed a class action suit "on behalf of all other professional
league baseball players similarly situated." Id. at 99. The Players Association, which as an unin-
corporated entity could not sue in federal court, chose Uhlaender as named plaintiff. Although
not entirely clear, it is possibly that they chose him because while playing for the Twins, he was a
legal resident of Texas, thereby establishing diversity jurisdiction. Id. at 99-100.
171. Uhlaender, 316 F. Supp. at 1282-83.
172. Hylton, supra note 166, at 102.
173. Uhlaender, 316 F. Supp. at 1279.
174. Hylton, supra note 166, at tot.
IS FANTASY BASEBALL FREE SPEECH?
IV. CONCLUSION
There are a number of intriguing themes running through the CBC
controversy: the difficulty of applying old laws to new technology; the
never-ending battle between intellectual property rights and the First
Amendment; the outrage of giving wealthy athletes another mecha-
nism to redistribute wealth upwards; and the combination of
America's two great pastimes, baseball and litigation. Perhaps the
court simply did not want MLB to scrape another layer of revenue
from the fans. A read-between-the-lines look at the opinion reveals a
hesitancy to make the rich richer, which may have infected the court's
analysis to a certain extent. In fact, the court noted that the athletes
were "handsomely" rewarded athletes who earned "large sums" of
money. 75
The purpose of this note was not to address the desirability of right
of publicity laws as a whole, 76 but merely to argue that as those laws
presently exist, they encompass fantasy sports. If MLB collects fees
for baseball cards and video games, then consistency suggests that it
should be allowed to collect fees for fantasy baseball as well. The First
Amendment simply does not extend so far as to offer protection to
fantasy baseball.
Of course, MLB probably did not increase its popularity by choos-
ing to fight this lawsuit all the way to the end. As stated by Daniel
Okrent, former public editor of the New York Times and one of the
founding fathers of fantasy baseball, "The only thing that saddens me
about it is that there won't be a public trial, during which MLB's in-
credible greed would have been on public display."' 77 Indeed, there is
ample room to question MLB's business decision. But if state law has
conferred upon the players a natural property right, it is a business
decision that is not for the fantasy providers, not for me, and not for a
court. If MLB wishes to keep a tight grip on the property it owns-
175. C.B.C., 505 F.3d at 824.
176. The desirability of right of publicity laws has been argued countless times from countless
perspectives. See, e.g., Roberta Rosenthall Kwall, Fame, 73 IND. L. J. 1 (1997); Vincent M. de
GrandprO, Understanding the Market for Celebrity: An Economic Analysis of the Right of Public-
ity, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 73 (2001). But see, e.g., Madow, supra note
75; White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc., 989 F.2d 1512 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting from denial of the petition for rehearing en banc).
177. Greg Johnson, Fantasy League Wins Ruling: Judge's decision that baseball statistics are in
public domain could have far-reaching effects, L.A. TIMEs. Aug. 9, 2006. at 3. See also Gabriel
Grossman, Switch Hitting: How C.B.C. v. MLB Advanced Media Refined the Right of Publicity,
14 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 285, 287 (2007).
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for reasons rational or irrational, transparent or secretive-it should
be able to do so.
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